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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
ROBERT H. HINCKLEY, INC., 
a corporation, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case involves the validity of an assessment for 
sales tax and the imposition of penalties and interest upon 
such sales tax deficiency, and the interpretation of the Utah 
sales tax law as applied to sales of ten cents ( lOc) and less 
through vending machines. The deficiency assessment was 
upheld by the Tax Commission after a formal hearing, as 
was the penalty and interest. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. The review sought and the statement of facts are 
as set forth in the plaintiff's and defendant's briefs. 
2. The amid curiae in this case, who filed this brief 
after leave of the Court having been first obtained, are per-
sons and corporations in the business of retailing through 
vending machines. Each of said persons and corporations 
sells candy, gum, life savers, popcorn, and soft drinks through 
these machines, and one of those persons sells fresh apples 
and pears by vending machines. A substantial portion of all 
of said businesses consists of retail sales of ten cents, or less, 
through vending machines in the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE UTAH SALES TAX IS A TAX ON THE 
VENDEE-CONSUMER. IT IS NOT NOW A "JOINT 
AND SEVERAL" TAX WHICH VENDOR AND VENDEE 
ARE PERMITTED TO ALLOCATE BY PRIVATE 
AGREEMENT, NOR IS IT A TAX ON THE VENDOR. 
The legislative history of this act, as set forth in the 
plaintiff's brief at page 11, et seq., shows that the sales tax 
in effect now and during the time covered by the assessments 
in this case is a consumer tax. Cases such as W. F. Jensen 
Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 350, 61 P.2d 
629, and State Tax Commission v. City Commission of Logan, 
88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197, a11e not in point because the tax 
has been changed to a consumer tax rather than a "permis· 
sive" vendee or vendor tax, as was the situation when the 
Jensen Candy case was decided. 
In addition to the authorities in the plaintiff's brief, 
we ask the Court to take judicial notice of the Seventeenth 
Biennial Report of the State Tax Commission to the Utah 
Legislature, which is filed pursuant to law, and particularly 
paragraph 15 thereof which reads as follows: 
"15. We respect fully recommend that the sales tax 
law be changed to a vendor or retailer type tax rather 
than a consumer tax. (Emphasis supplied) 
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"There is some confusion as to whether the sales 
tax is a consumer tax, but it is generally regarded to 
be so. If the act were amended, it would eliminate this 
confusion and will make it possible to tax some sales 
of personal property which are not now being taxed." 
The Tax Commission itself recognizes and administra-
tively construes the present sales tax as a tax on the con-
sumer. 
Point II. 
THE TAX COMMISSION, BY ITS REGULATIONS, 
MAY NOT LAWFULLY CONVERT THE TAX FROM 
ONE ON THE CONSUMER TO ONE ON THE SELLER. 
It is submitted that this proposition is self-evident and 
needs only to be stated to be upheld. The Tax Commission 
must take the law from the Legislature and cannot, for ad-
ministrative convenience or for any other reason, change the 
law as enacted by the legislative branch of the government. 
The naked situation in this case is that the Tax Commis-
sion, by regulation, is trying to convert the sales tax from a 
tax on the consumer to a tax on the seller. This can be the 
only theory for the deficiency assessment and resulting 
penalties and interest imposed. 
We submit that the Tax Commission has no such authori-
ty. It can make reasonable rules and regulations to carry 
out the legislative intent, but it has no authority to change 
the entire theory and purpose of the tax and defeat the pur-
pose and intent of the Legislature. Section 59-15-20, U.C.A. 
\ 1953); E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 
563, 168 P. 2d 324 ( 1946); 'and authorities cited at page 28 
of plaintiff's brief. 
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If the _Tax Commission is allowed to convert this tax 
from a tax on the consumer (as the Legislature established 
it) to one on the seller, in ten cent and less sales, the legis-
lative purpose is perverted - including its manifest desire 
to have the consumer know that he is paying the tax and 
how much that tax is, as recognized and required by Tax 
Commission rules. 
The Tax Commission's Regulation 74 attempting to im· 
pose a "gross receipts" tax on vending machine vendors in 
lieu of the statutory sales tax on the vendee is outside the 
authority and jurisdiction of the Tax Commission, is uncon· 
stitutional, and void. 
Point III. 
UNDER THE LAW AND VALID REGULATIONS 
NO TAX IS COLLECTIBLE ON SALES OF TEN CENTS 
OR LESS, AND THE VENDOR AS COLLECTING 
AGENT IS NOT LIABLE TO REMIT TAXES NOT 
COLLECTIBLE OR COLLECTED FROM THE VENDEE· 
CONSUMER. 
The seller is the collecting agent; and, in those cases 
where he can lawfully and practically collect the tax from 
the consumer, he has the duty to collect that tax and pay it 
to the State Tax Commission. If he does not perform that 
duty he is penalized by having to pay the tax himself because 
of the dereliction of his duty to collect, not because the tax 
is imposed upon the seller. This is the import of the follow· 
ing cases cited by the Tax Commission as authorities for the 
proposition that the tax is imposed on the seller: 
Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P. 2d 422 (1961) 
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E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission 109 Utah 563 
' ' 168 P. 2d 324 (1964) 
Dupler's Art Furs, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 108 
Utah 513, 161 P. 2d 788 (1945) 
State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 
100 P. 2d 575 ( 1940) 
The question in the case now before the Court is: Does 
the seller have to pay the tax himself in those instances where 
it is either unlawful or, as a practical matter, impossible for 
that seller to collect the tax from the consumer? 
This question has not been before the Court before be-
cause all previous cases have either involved the law which 
imposed the tax on the transaction, with the seller having the 
option to collect or not from the consumer (such as the Jensen 
Candy case), or they involved cases where the seller could 
have collected the tax, but did not. 
On sales of ten cents or less, the seller cannot practically 
or lawfully collect a sales tax from the consumer. This is 
because there are no tokens or money less than one cent, and 
because of Tax Commission Regulations (Local Sales Tax 
Regulation No. 3, 1961) and State law (Section 59-15-5, 
U.C.A., 1953), which make it unlawful for a seller to collect 
any tax on a sale of less than fourteen cents ( 14c), where 
the tax at the authorized rate is less than one-half cent. So 
in this case it is both illegal and impossible for the seller to 
act as the collector of this tax. 
Under this statute the vendor-collector is required only 
to remit "the amount of tax herein required to be collected 
by the vendor ... ". The statute does require that "the ven-
dor shall collect the tax from the vendee, but in no case shall 
he collect as tax an amount (without regard to fractional 
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parts of one cent) in excess of the tax computed at the rates 
prescribed· by this act." Applying the proper rule of strict 
statutory construction of a tax statute, the Tax Commission. 
by its Local Sales Tax Regulation No. 3, has properly and 
administratively construed this Statute as excluding the col-
lection of tax where the amount of the tax at the proper rate 
is less than one-half cent. Any other construction leads to 
the absurdity of collecting a 100 % tax of one cent on a penny 
sale of gum. Where the prQPer tax rate applied to the sale 
price results in a tax of less than one-half cent it is clear 
that the Legislature and the Tax Commission intended that 
the tax should be waived as uncollectible. This is the only 
common-sense conclusion. 
Under this circumstance the seller is not breaching any 
duty, or any statutory obligation imposed upon him, in his 
failure to collect and remit the tax. Thus, the rule in the 
cases relied upon by the Tax Commission does not apply 
because there is no breach of a duty by the seller. 
The Tax Commission in its brief implies that the plain· 
tiff desires the Court to hold sales of ten cents or less are 
not "subject to sales tax". This is misleading. It appears to 
us that all retail sales, other than those expressly exempt 
(which sales are not here involved), are "subject to the sales 
tax". However, the Legislature and the Tax Commission by 
its regulations have made it so that the seller cannot lawfully, 
and as a practical matter it cannot, collect that tax from the 
consumer on sales of ten cents or less. If tokens were re· 
established, or if there were a coin smaller than one cent, it 
would be possible to collect the tax on such sales. But in the 
absence of tokens or some other practical device there is no 
way a consumer tax can be collected from the consumer on 
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a ten cent or less sale with the present tax rate. As no tax 
can be collected, the collector is not required to remit tax. 
This is just an application of the familiar maxim that the 
law does not require the impossible. Where performance of 
a duty is impossible, non-performance is excused, and ordi-
nary penalties for non-performance are suspended. This is 
ordinary, basic justice. It is implicit in the statute and is 
the basis of the entire "bracket" system excusing the con-
sumer-taxpayer from paying tax amounting to less than one-
half cent. 
CONCLUSION 
The tax here involved is on the consumer. The vendor 
is merely the collector of that tax, with the obligation to 
pay the tax himself if he fails to perform his duty of collec-
tion in those situations where he can lawfully and practically 
make the collection. He has no duty to do the impossible 
or unlaw Jul. In this case the seller has not failed to perform 
its duty to collect the tax because it could not lawfully and 
it could not as a practical matter collect the tax from the 
consumer. Since the seller has violated no duty and since 
the tax is not imposed upon a seller directly, the assessment 
here made and the penalties and interest thereon are invalid 
and should be set aside. The attempt by the State Tax Com-
mission to convert this tax from one on the consumer to one 
on the seller is invalid, and the seller's obligation to pay the 
tax arises only in those cases where he has violated his duty 
to collect it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DANIEL A. ALSUP 
JACK A. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
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